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Vietnamese and Chinese Movies about Royalty: 
From Confucian Cosmology to Ecological Politics
Cam-Giang HOANG*
Abstract
Since 2002, with the enormously successful release of the movie Hero by Zhang Yimou, 
we have been witnessing the resurrection of the royal theme in contemporary East Asian 
cinema, and the return of Confucian cosmology as its philosophical foundation. In this 
paper, I focus on Vietnamese films which represent royal subjects and court life, like 
Heroes of the Tay Son Dynasty (Tây Sơn hào kiệt; Lý Hùng, Lý Huỳnh, and Phượng 
Hoàng; 2010), Blood Letter (Thiên mệnh anh hùng, Victor Vũ, 2012), and Tam Cam The 
Untold Story (Tấm Cám chuyện chưa kể, Ngô Thanh Vân, 2016); and Chinese films, like 
Hero (英雄, Zhang Yimou, 2002), The Banquet (夜宴, Feng Xiaogang, 2006), and Red 
Cliff (赤壁, John Woo, 2008). Firstly and most importantly, my essay examines how the 
cosmic and environmental elements in such movies are manipulated to advocate some 
particular political discourse as a kind of ecological politics. From this analysis, I analyse 
and explain the similarities in how the filmmakers in Vietnam and China establish the ste-
reotypes of power and legitimacy of authority utilizing and transforming the Confucian 
spiritual cosmology. I also try to clarify the difference between the two cinemas in how 
they express the concepts “the Unity of Heaven and Man” (tianren heyi), “Rectification 
of Names” (zhengming), and “Virtue of Loving Life” (haosheng) in their political impli-
cations. Finally, I will discuss the layers of meaning and visual narratives by analysing 
the characters and social contexts of the films to reaffirm the varying degrees of influence 
of Confucian tradition on contemporary forms of cultural and political practices.
Keywords: Confucian cosmology, historical movies on royalty, ecological politics, “the 
Unity of Heaven and Man”, “Rectification of Names”, “Virtue of Loving Life”
Vietnamski in kitajski filmi o kraljevih družinah: od konfucijanske kozmo-
logije do okoljevarstvenih politik 
Izvleček
Od leta 2002, ko je bil prvič predvajan izjemno uspešen film Junak (英雄, Hero) v režiji 
Zhang Yimouja, smo bili priča ponovnega vstajenja kraljevske tematike v sodobnem 
vzhodnoazijskem filmu in vrnitvi konfucijanske kozmologije kot njegovega filozofskega 
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temelja. V tem članku se osredotočam na vietnamske filme, ki uprizarjajo člane kraljevih 
družin in življenje na dvoru, kot na primer Junaki dinastije Tay Son (Tây Sơn hào kiệt; Lý 
Hùng, Lý Huỳnh in Phượng Hoàng; 2010), Krvavo pismo (Thiên mệnh anh hùng, Victor 
Vũ, 2012) in Tam Cam: Zamolčana zgodba (Tấm Cám chuyện chưa kể, Ngô Thanh Vân, 
2016), ter kitajske filme, kot so Junak (英雄, Zhang Yimou, 2002), Gostija (夜宴, Feng 
Xiaogang, 2006) in Rdeča pečina (赤壁, John Woo, 2008). Najprej in najpomembneje, 
moj esej preučuje, na kakšen način tovrstni filmi ravnajo s kozmičnimi in okoljskimi ele-
menti, da bi tako zagovarjali določen politični diskurz kot vrsto okoljevarstvene politike. 
V okviru te analize želim preučiti in razložiti podobnosti, kako z uporabo ter preobrazbo 
konfucijanske duhovne kozmologije kitajski in vietnamski filmarji ustvarjajo stereotipe 
moči in legitimnosti. V članku bom prav tako poskusil pojasniti razliko, kako s sporoča-
njem političnih implikacij obravnavani filmski industriji izražata »enotnost Neba in Člo-
veka« (tianren heyi), »pravilnost imen« (zhengming) in »vrednoto ljubezni do življenja« 
(haosheng). Nazadnje bom z analizo likov in družbenih kontekstov v filmih obravnaval 
še njihove pomenske sloje ter vizualno narativo, da bi tako ponovno potrdil spreminja-
joče se stopnje vpliva konfucijanske tradicije na oblike sodobnih kulturnih in političnih 
običajev.
Ključne besede: konfucijanska kozmologija, zgodovinski filmi o kraljevih družinah, 
okoljevarstvene politike, »enotnost Neba in Človeka«, »pravilna imena«, »vrednota lju-
bezni do življenja« 
Introduction
Hero and the Rise of Historical Movies on Royalty in East Asia
As socialist countries that share a long tradition of Confucianism, Vietnam and 
China have many cultural, ideological, and political similarities. In the last two 
decades, their intense contact with capitalism has significantly changed their en-
tertainment and film industries. Contrary to previous periods in the 20the century, 
especially since China joined the WTO in 2001 and Vietnam in 2007, the gov-
ernment-planned films produced by state-owned studios have decreased and only 
carry symbolic value, while commercial cinema (according to the Hollywood 
model) is encouraged in order to maximize foreign investment and strengthen 
domestic private companies. At the same time, the independent cinema (art-house 
style) peripherally developed its own path. The state has increasingly coordinated 
with private companies to produce or distribute commercial films, especially in 
China. Now, the monopolized production of state-owned studios has almost end-
ed in the era of global integration in both Vietnam and China (Aranburu 2017, 
12; Nguyệt 2018).
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In this context, Zhang Yimou’s movie, Hero, released in 2002 created quite a stir 
in the Chinese-language film market and the wider world for combining state-
owned film studios, domestic private film studios, and studios abroad. After Ju 
Dou (1990), The Story of Qiu Ju (1992), To Live (1994), and The Road Home 
(1999), and thus after a long period of examining the topic of the “bottom peo-
ple” of society using the style of neorealism and the art-house system, the veteran 
fifth-generation Chinese director Zhang Yimou seemed to have chosen a new 
career direction. Hero marked the first time that Zhang made a historical wuxia1 
movie, the first time expensive digital effects were used in Asian cinema history, 
and the first Mainland film to gross more than $100 million worldwide. 
Hero’s substantial financial success quickly made making blockbuster historical 
films a trend, primarily focusing on the grand and lavish context of the great dy-
nasties in Chinese history, such as Curse of the Golden Flower (Zhang 2006); The 
Banquet (Feng 2006); Red Cliff 1, 2 (Woo 2008; 2009); The Great Wall (Zhang 
2016); etc.2 
It was not only a turning point in Zhang Yimou’s career but also of Chinese cine-
ma after China joined the WTO, when the “the state acknowledged the important 
strategic function of the cultural industries in statecraft and declared it would 
invest in these in order to strengthen its national power”, and this led to the emer-
gence of the “discussion around the concept of soft power” (Zhang 2012, 25). 
A mixture of long-traditional socialist propaganda films (zhuxuanlu) and Holly-
wood-like blockbusters (dapian) helped materialize this soft power (Davis 2010, 
125; Aranburu 2017, 12).3 With this, expensive commercial films produced by 
private companies are under the control of and co-participate with state corpora-
tions (especially large-scale historical films, like Hero) to reproduce nationalism 
in the popular supranational film industry.
In Vietnam, critics highly recommend this Chinese historical film production 
model for domestic filmmakers to refer to in the new millennium. In Vietnamese 
1 “Wuxia” which means “martial heroes”, is a popular genre of Chinese-language cinema that devel-
oped from the kind of Chinese fiction concerning the adventures of martial artists in ancient China 
(Teo 2009, 2–3).
2 These films later significantly affected Korean and Vietnamese cinema, with The King and the 
Clown (Lee 2005), Masquerade (Choo 2012), The King’s Face (Yoon and Cha 2014), The Fatal 
Encounter (Lee 2014), Rampant (Kim 2018) (South Korea) and The Prince and the Pagoda Boy 
(Lưu 2010), Heroes of the Tay Son Dynasty (Lý 2010), Ly Cong Uan: The Road to Thang Long 
Citadel (Cận and Tạ 2011), Blood Letter (Vũ 2012), The Nymph (Đinh 2015), Tam Cam: The 
Untold Story (Ngô 2016) (Vietnam).
3 “Zhuxuanlu” or “main melody” movies are the Chinese state-sponsored and propaganda works 
“glorifying the lives of Party officials, celebrating heroic incidents, or portraying war stories and 
patriotic melodramas” (Davis 2010, 125).
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media channels, crucial formulas drawn from Chinese historical films have cre-
ated an “effective way of ‘splashing money’ by filmmakers” in order to make 
“blockbuster works” to “please audiences with grandiose scenery, beautiful tech-
niques, (and) popular stars”, “content that catches up to the trendy entertainment”, 
“offering many benefits for domestic businesses”, with filmmakers feeling “less 
pressured to stick to the truth” (Tuyết 2014; Phong 2018; VTV News 2018). 
However, it was after the 1000th anniversary of Thăng Long-Dong Do-Hanoi 
(2010) that a series of historical films about Vietnamese royalty was born. Af-
terward, private filmmakers also started producing historical films, a trend that 
continued from 2010 to the present.
The Ideal Personality Models and the Return of Confucian Tradition
Going back to Hero, besides the recognition of film critics in Vietnam and oth-
er countries around the world about the supranational scale of filmmaking, this 
movie represents a model of the hero in relation to authority as an ideal ruler of 
society, which has a specific power to unite the whole world. The return of the 
“ideal ruler of society” reminds us of core Confucian ethics, especially those 
of primitive Confucianism. The models of certain cultural characters, such as 
the emperor (huangdi), hero (yingxiong), Confucian gentleman/superior person 
( junzi), Confucian scholar (Ruzhe), etc. are associated with the knowledge base 
in the Confucian feudal period, and are emphasized and restructured to focus on 
the theme of royal life based on Confucian ethics and cosmology.
Many scholars in the last decade have acknowledged a Confucian revival in Chi-
na in the twenty-first century, in parallel with the country’s economic growth, 
the increase in national soft power and the need to face global challenges such as 
environmental degradation and the immigration crisis (Tu 2000; Yang, Fenggang 
2011; Tan 2012; Hammond and Richey 2015; Hon 2017; Pang 2018; Deng and 
Smith 2018). In Vietnam, Confucian ideology and Confucian research have also 
been revived, with many different levels and forms (Phan 1994; Quang 1994; 
Nguyễn, Kim Sơn 2003; Minh 2005; Vũ 2009; Lý 2015; Cao 2017). The con-
nection between the explosion of movies on royal themes (with feudal historical 
figures) and the spectacular return of Confucianism in the last two decades, after 
being rejected during the Cultural Revolution in China and the Land Reform in 
Vietnam, needs an explanation. 
To achieve this, my article will examine what is happening with the rise of the 
royal court theme in contemporary Chinese and Vietnamese cinema. Why do the 
products of the modern cultural industry reproduce the values once considered 
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obsolete? Why are these films focused on the relationship between certain typ-
ical personality types in society and the power of the universe/nature, and how 
do these relationships relate to the power discourses of the current communist 
rulers in China and Vietnam? Moreover, based on the growing ecological crisis 
in both countries, do these films, with their return to the typical feudal contexts, 
lead viewers to an environmental discourse that praises and respects nature and 
promotes the harmonious resonance between people and the universe? The article 
not only analyses how Vietnamese films, like Heroes of the Tay Son Dynasty (Lý 
2010), Blood Letter (Vũ 2012), and Tam Cam The Untold Story (Ngô 2016), and 
Chinese films, like Hero (Zhang 2002), The Banquet (Feng 2006), and Red Cliff 
(Woo 2008),4 share similar ideologies, but also explains the differences between 
Vietnamese and Chinese movies about court life related to reproducing the Con-
fucian cosmology and ecological/biological injustice in the context of contem-
porary politics. This is because through Confucian cosmology the filmmakers 
have clearly presented a discourse on the “support of the universe” for the current 
political regime, expressed through signals from the vast and mysterious nature. 
These are the inherent forces that are highly revered by East Asian people.
From discourse theory, as well as cultural anthropology and ecocriticism, I will 
analyse the expression and functioning of the discourse of the rulers––universe/
nature––people relations in the films listed above; as well as the way natural/
cosmic elements are applied to justify the legitimacy and ethics of contemporary 
authorities. The concepts and ideas of various Confucian schools throughout his-
tory will be used to compare with the cinematic texts, especially Confucius cos-
mology, the theory of the “rectification of names” and “virtue of loving life”; and 
the philosophy of “Heaven’s Mandate”, “The Unity of Heaven and Humanity” by 
Dong Zhongshu. 
“The Unity of Heaven and Humanity”: Confucian Cosmology as 
the Foundational Ethical Discourse 
With a deep philosophical foundation based on the relationship between man and 
Heaven and the issue of human nature, Confucianism is essentially a theory of 
4 These particular movies are also prominent commercial products on the subject of royalty and 
power, have had high box office sales, and received significant attention from domestic and for-
eign media. In these films, the striking natural images are also always associated with the theme of 
kingship and emperors/rulers, which I will investigate in this article.
 From here on, sometimes these six movies will be replaced by HMOR (“historical movies on 
royalty”); Heroes of the Tay Son Dynasty is shortened to Heroes; Tam Cam The Untold Story is 
shortened to Tam Cam.
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moral cultivation aimed at creating ideal individuals and ideal societies. Consid-
ering the interrelatedness between the self, family, community, and the universe 
as concentric circles, Mary E. Tucker writes: 
The moral cultivation of the individual influences the larger circles of so-
ciety and politics, as is evident in the text of the Great Learning, and that 
influence extends to nature, as is clear in the Doctrine of the Mean. All 
of these interacting circles are contained within the vast cosmos itself. 
(Tucker 2005, 2631) 
Rodney L. Taylor and Howard Choy also point out this resonant connection, de-
fining Confucianism as
an in-depth analysis of the nature of the self and its relation to the world 
at large (…which seeks…) a method of learning that would allow for the 
cultivation of a self that bore the capacity for the unfoldment of its true 
nature. (Taylor and Choy 2005, 126) 
They also emphasize how Confucianism connects humanity and Heaven and 
helps in the establishment of social order: 
Ultimately, such order within human society is a reflection of the struc-
ture and order of the cosmos itself. Heaven, earth, and humankind each 
has its duties; each has its responsibilities. Duties are manifest in ritual 
within such distinctions between things. The result is order. (ibid., 117) 
In general, the ultimate purpose of the elements of Confucian ethics and cosmolo-
gy is to propose methods of operation so that society can reach stability (Yao and 
Shun).5 In other words, Confucianism is a doctrine of social management through 
self-cultivation and adjustment, stabilizing human lives/spirituality among the 
cosmic factors as well.
From that starting point, the Confucian classics often refer to the essential char-
acteristic of the Confucian world view as “Heaven and Humankind as One” 
5 Regarding the motif of the legendary emperors Yao and Shun, Encyclopaedia Britannica (2019a; 
2019b) states that: “Shun, formally Yudi Shun, in Chinese mythology, a legendary emperor (c. 
23rd century BC) of the golden age of antiquity, singled out by Confucius as a model of integrity 
and resplendent virtue. His name is invariably associated with that of Yao, his legendary prede-
cessor”; “Yao, formally Tangdi Yao, in Chinese mythology, a legendary emperor (c. 24th century 
BC) of the golden age of antiquity, exalted by Confucius as an inspiration and perennial model of 
virtue, righteousness, and unselfish devotion.”
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(tianren heyi) where the Ch’i (Qi) or vital force infuses everything.6 The Con-
fucian tradition advises people to cultivate their Ch’i through the practice of Li 
(ritual/propriety) and Yue (music), completing the cycle of cosmic resonance: 
“Rite is the order of Heaven and Earth; Music is the harmonization of Heaven and 
Earth” (Confucius 1999, 174).7 Human moral and emotional transformation both 
affect the universe, and vice versa, combined in an inseparable unity. When social 
order turns into chaos by the degeneration of morality, it will also cause disorder 
in the flow of Ch’i and result in disasters in the universe, according to a famous 
Han dynasty scholar named Dong Zhongshu: 
When he is orderly, salutary qi blends with the transformation of Heaven 
and Earth. When he is disorderly, noxious qi blends with the transfor-
mation of Heaven and Earth (…) When he identifies with Heaven, there 
is mutual benefit. When he differs from Heaven, there is mutual harm. 
(Dong 2016, 606) 
From Dong’s notion, we can see the ideal order of the world through the relation 
between Heaven and humankind through the “Son of Heaven” (Tianzi) or the 
Emperor: “One who may be called a king forms a triad with Heaven and Earth 
(…) Heaven establishes kings not on behalf of rulers but on behalf of the peo-
ple” (ibid., 232, 606). The Emperor is the only one who has “Heaven’s mandate” 
(tianming) and the “Rectification of Names” (zhengming) to rule the “under the 
Heaven” or “the people”.8 
In the central part of this article, I analyse pairs of Vietnamese and Chinese 
films that have many similarities and differences in how they display issues of 
6 Tu Weiming defines the concept of Ch’i as the “vital force” that infuses the spontaneously self-gen-
erating and constantly transforming world (Tu 2004, 27). Connecting the “cosmic process” and 
“Chi’i”, Tu Weiming argues that: “Forming one body with the universe can literally mean that 
since all modalities of being are made of ch’i, human life is part of a continuous flow of the blood 
and breath that constitutes the cosmic process. Human beings are thus organically connected with 
rocks, trees, and animals.” (ibid., 34)
7 Robert Weller analysed this idea of Confucius: “Musical resonance of this type was cited time and 
again as a prototypical example of cosmic resonance, and this image of two lute strings attuned to 
one another, vibrating in sympathy, is central to all models of cosmic resonance theory.” (Weller 
in Tucker and Berthrong 1998, 317)
8 “Rectification of Names” (zhengming) is one of the most critical concepts of Confucius thought. 
In Analects, Confucius argues that: “Only when names are rectified, will language be used cor-
rectly, and only with the correct use of language, can undertakings be completed. If undertakings 
are not completed, then rites, music, law, and punishment will also fail and with them the order of 
society.” (Confucius 2003, 423–24) According to The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Confucianism, 
“Confucius suggests that the chün-tzu (noble person) should use appropriate names so that he can 
speak and act appropriately” (Taylor 2005, 48).
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Confucian ethics and cosmology. There, the way Vietnamese and Chinese film-
makers promote, strengthen, or question the notion of “tianren heyi”9 will also be 
examined.
Hero and Blood Letter: The Despot Who Carries the Mandate of 
Heaven and the Converting of Heaven’s Yi10
A key point in the historical movies on royalty (HMOR) from 2000 to the present 
is the expression of the interoperability and resonance between people and the 
universe, in the direction of spiritualization. It is because these films focus on 
portraits of feudal dynasties that we always see a kind of “chosen man”, a hero 
model that incorporates many typical medieval patterns: kings, knights, nobles, 
Confucian scholars. This type of character is the only person who is destined from 
Heaven to lead and teach people according to “the Way” (Dao).11 These charac-
ters have the “mandate of Heaven” and will always have mysterious interrelations 
with the supernatural forces.
Zhang Yimou’s Hero built a strong story to affirm this principle founded on Con-
fucian spiritual cosmology.12 In the film, Qin Wang is a person who bears a “no-
ble mission” to dominate all realms, unifying China into a single nation. The four 
great knights, Wuming, Changkong, Canjian, and Feixue, sought to assassinate 
Qin Wang but eventually gave up that goal because they understood that, despite 
Qin Wang’s cruelty and violence, “the people” needed him to avoid bloody ter-
ritorial disputes and disorder. The pain of personal hatred is the price they paid 
to achieve the “unity of the world” and to follow the “Heaven’s mandate” of the 
tyrant king. Similarly, in Vietnamese movie entitled Blood Letter, Nguyên Vũ 
(the grandson of Nguyễn Trãi who survived the Lệ Chi Viên tragedy) eventually 
9 From here, sometimes this phrase (“Heaven and Humankind as One”) will be replaced by “tianren 
heyi”.
10 Yi (义, Righteousness) is one of the essential concepts of Confucian doctrine. Yi is the “funda-
mental principle of morality”, and “represents this ideal of totality as well as a decision-generating 
ability to apply a virtue properly and appropriately in a situation” (Cheng 1972, 269, 271).
11 The term means a sort of ethical system for human behavior.
12 The aspects of Confucian cosmology here are profoundly spiritual, as it indicates that every move-
ment of man and the creatures in the universe directly affect Heaven through the vital essence, 
and vice versa, as in Weller’s analysis: “The author (Hoai-nan Tzu) intends us to understand the 
‘report’ of the Spirit to be an instance of cosmic resonance. The Spirit, being itself made of quin-
tessential ch’i, receives and respond to vibrations arising from other objects or people and carried 
by the Vital Essence (…) Human consciousness is thus implicit in and susceltible to the same 
processes of cosmic resonance that affect trees, iron, magnets, and lute strings.” (Weller in Tucker 
and Berthrong 1998, 318, 321)
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dropped his mission to assassinate the Empress to take revenge on the whole 
family. Like Wuming, Changkong, Canjian, and Feixue, he also did not want the 
people to suffer from wars and instead recognized their need for a leader with the 
Mandate of Heaven.
Of course, the heroes/assassins in these movies do not give up their revenge eas-
ily. The problem is that they always receive sacred signs from the universe and 
the natural world to guide their actions and show them who is carrying the “Man-
date”. They need to dismiss their sentiment for the benefit of the nation and com-
munity. In Hero, Qin Wang suddenly discovers the lies of Wuming. The wind 
blowing the flickering candles in front of the king causes him to figure out Wum-
ing’s mental uncertainty and his false narrative. Similarly, in Blood Letter, the 
night before he planned to kill the Empress, Nguyên Vũ had a bloody nightmare 
where his grandfather came back to prevent him from taking revenge. In that 
dream, Nguyên Vũ stabbed the Empress, and a monster appeared on the throne 
wearing the crown, resulting in the whole world being immersed in the blood, 
smoke, and faces of beasts. That dream led him to give up the mission that he had 
devoted himself to complete. 
The universe and supernatural forces intervened in the governance of rulers, such 
as Qin Wang in Hero or the Empress in Blood Letter, so that those who wanted 
to assassinate them had to be converted by “Tian Yi” (Heaven’s righteousness). 
It is a predestined morality established by Heaven. Thus, the interdependence 
between man and Heaven is presented as the harmony between Heaven and the 
“Son of Heaven”, who represents the people. From that, the discourse on “Son of 
Heaven” joins two other fundamental moral concepts of Confucianism, namely 
“the right man” (junzi) and the “hero” (yingxiong) who are holding, decoding, and 
using the whole mystical energy of the universe effectively. Also, in these two 
movies, the directors shift the focus of building the ideal Emperor model from the 
moral aspect (with his great benevolence and virtue) to the spiritual and cosmo-
logical aspect (with his Mandate of Heaven).
The Banquet and Tam Cam The Untold Story: The Return of 
Crowned Prince, the Rectification of Names And The “Cosmic Judge”
With the second pair of movies, The Banquet and Tam Cam The Untold Story, the 
“tianren heyi” primarily aims at rigorous deterrence and education at a universe 
level, especially for those who violate the Mandate of Heaven and are disloyal 
to the Son of Heaven. Here, the “natural world as a judge” or “cosmic judge” 
discourse is closely attached to the theme of revenge and the legitimacy of royal 
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figures. There are some common themes in the two films: the betrayal of the most 
influential and most trusted mandarin in the court, the death of the king, the es-
cape of the crowned prince, and so on. 
Firstly, in this kind of story the biggest issue is the usurper’s “rectification of 
names”. For example, in The Banquet, when the new king (who was assassinated 
by his brother) and the courtiers discuss the biological features of the snow leop-
ard, the king also implies satisfaction with the flexible adaptation of the courtiers 
when the political situation changes: “When the snow flow down, this animal 
hides in the cave to take care of his fur. On a sunny day, he appears brightly. He 
knows the weather. He is a mascot.” (The Banquet 2006, 36: 33). However, Pei 
Hong (a faithful governor of the former dynasty) says that the new king should 
give a snow leopard carved of stone to Yin Taichang, who was a Minister of the 
old king and now follows the new king, because “Taichang is as changeable as a 
snow leopard.” (ibid., 37: 27). After that, General Yin Sun (Taichang’s son) gets 
angry and wants to kill Pei Hong because this is an insult to Taichang, indicating 
his father’s disloyalty. Only after a short discussion about the legendary animal 
can we see the story in The Banquet interpreted not only from the perspective of 
tragedy and personal revenge, as in Hamlet, but it also as the story of the violation 
of “heavenly law” or the final rituals and morals of Confucianism.13 
In Tam Cam, the Minister Tào Khắc could kill both the king and prince because 
he avoided becoming a “usurper” but wanted to be a legitimate successor: “If the 
neighbouring state invades, the king and the prince would be killed by their enemy 
according to my plan; then as the minister, I would stand up to quell a revolt, so that 
I have the ‘rectification of names’ sitting on the throne.” (Tam Cam 2016, 55: 10).
In both films, the “rewards and punishments” through nature and supernatural 
forces are based on the “rectification of names” criterion. Here, the discourse 
“nature as a judge”, always tied to revenge against the royal character, turns into 
the “ecophobia” that marks the atmosphere of both stories. In The Banquet, soli-
tary nature is a refuge that comforts the shattered heart of Prince Vo Loan. When 
his uncle’s army came to assassinate him, the lake protected him. Unlike Shake-
speare’s play, the uncle’s betrayal is not the central crime in Feng Xiaogang’s 
The Banquet. Finally, Empress Wan seems to be the most unethical Confucian, 
since she has an affair with three men in the same family, so she must suffer the 
most severe consequences. Wan must witness the death of all the men who loved 
her and those she loved, and then she is killed by an unknown knife falling from 
13 The Banquet is a loose adaption of the tragedy Hamlet. Shakespeare’s play depicts prince Hamlet 
and his revenge against his uncle, Claudius, who has murdered Hamlet’s father to seize his throne 
and marry Hamlet’s mother.
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Heaven. The knife sinks to the bottom of the water, and the fish swim around, 
licking the blood to show the punishment coming from the universe, and the 
wrath of creation when moral orders are overturned. 
Similarly, in Tam Cam, when the king, prince and his wife (Tấm) were in distress, 
thunder and lightning appeared in the sky (like the night the traitors assassinated 
the king, and the minister deceived the prince, Cám, and her mother killed Tấm, 
etc.) When Cám (the beautiful and evil half-sister of Tấm) seeks to enter the pal-
ace to become the new queen replacing her lost sister and join Tào Khắc to gain 
power from the court, a series of strange natural phenomena acted against her. 
(For example: the yellow oriole prevents the prince from escaping the dangerous 
charm of the Cám, the tree branch falls to block the arrow shot at him by a hid-
den assassin, the tree meshes reach out to lift him when he is pushed down into 
the abyss, his wife is also reborn from a miraculous gold apple, and so on.) In an 
extraordinary series of events, he transforms into a monster kills the beast, Tào 
Khắc, and finally change back to his human form. The folk philosophy “one good 
turn deserves another” (ở hiền gặp lành) fits with Confucian ethics. For exam-
ple, after acting with inhuman strength, he could still return entirely back to his 
original human state because the most significant difference between the prince 
and Tào Khắc is not his strength, but Heaven’s mandate. The mandate is attached 
to “benevolence” and the “rectification of names”, which are the two core moral 
standards of the ideal rulers.
Red Cliff and Heroes of the Tay Son Dynasty: The Virtue of Rulers, 
“Righteous Substitute” and the Flexibility of “Heaven’s Mandate”
The idiom, “Heaven and Men as Oneness”, manifests in a more complex aspect, 
through the flow of Ch’i circulating between the cosmos and humanity, in Red 
Cliff and Heroes of the Tay Son Dynasty. Here, the challenge with Confucian 
ethics displays itself in the relationship between a knightly assassin and a man-
dated tyrant (as in Hero and Blood Letter), or between a “son of Heaven” and a 
usurper (as in The Banquet and Tam Cam). Both Red Cliff and Heroes propose a 
“righteous surrogate royal force” who is strong enough to defeat the old dynasty’s 
usurpers. 
Red Cliff begins with a small bird flying into the palace and landing on the hand 
of King Han. Later, when General Cao Cao threatens and forces the king to let his 
soldiers go to battle, the small bird leaves in a panic. This opening will explain 
the entire later part of the film, when Cao Cao betrays Heaven’s mandate, violates 
the “rectification of names”, and joins the unrighteous side in the war against the 
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three Liu Bei brothers (originally from the Han family that has the pure royal 
blood). Thus, Cao still suffers a heavy defeat by the Liu Bei––Sun Quan alliance 
because the unexpected change in the direction of the wind made the fire turn 
back suddenly and destroy Cao’s army. At this time, the Liu-Sun alliance could 
be considered as a new representative of the Mandate of Heaven transferred from 
an old force (King Han) who could not shoulder the sacred mission anymore. 
In Heroes, despite having the superior force Nguyễn Huệ always respected the Le 
dynasty. During his first time leading the troops into the capital of Thăng Long, 
Nguyễn Huệ takes the title of “advocating Le to exterminate Trinh” helping the 
orthodox “Heaven’s son” (Le) and ending the Trinh encroachment with Le’s au-
thority. Not only that, Nguyễn Huệ cements his power by marrying Ngọc Hân, Lê 
Hiển Tông’s daughter, to enter the royal bloodline as the King’s son-in-law. He 
also retreats to Central Vietnam, not to Thăng Long to run the court. Only when 
Lê Hiển Tông dies does the new king, Le Chieu Thong, bring the Qing army from 
China into the capital. Nguyễn Huệ officially accedes to the throne and proceeds 
to Thăng Long to overthrow the foreign enemy and establish the Tây Sơn dynas-
ty. In this sequence, the narrator’s voice shown over a scene of moving soldiers 
implies the commitment to protect the nation’s beauty: “Following heavenly will 
and the people’s aspiration, on November 22, 1788, Nguyễn Huệ was crowned as 
an Emperor. It was the first year of Quang Trung dynasty.” (Heroes 2010, 52: 34).
Similarly, the two heroes (Quang Trung and Liu Bei) both support their suffering 
people by caring for their welfare. Their ability to show compassion indicates 
their leadership skills. I suppose that, in Vietnam, the story of the “hero in plain 
clothing”, the “farmer hero” or hero attached to the working class is a popular 
stereotype in contemporary literature, cinema, painting, and other forms of pop 
culture, because of its concordance with the Communist ideology.14 Liu Bei in 
Red Cliff also appears as a rustic leader who stands up and gathers poor labourers 
to fight for a just cause. 
14 In recent years, the following movies have all praised the figure of King Quang Trung based on the 
discourse of a “farmer hero”: Heroes of the Tay Son Dynasty (Lý, Lý and Phượng 2010); Quang 
Trung – Nguyễn Huệ Dynasty (Nguyễn 2016); The Hero in Plain Clothing (Phùng 2017); Emperor 
Quang Trung from History (Nguyễn 2018).
 Also, in the historical documents, anecdotes, and literature, the image of King Quang Trung, pri-
marily when written by northern writers (before 1975) and orthodox historians, is honored and 
recognized by the state, according to the above trend. See Phan Huy Lê, Hoàng Xuân Hãn, and 
Trần Văn Giàu (2006), and Nguyễn Văn Lục (2014). Nguyen Quang Vinh also had a talk entitled 
“Emperor Quang Trung Nguyễn Huệ and the Tây Sơn period (1771–1802) in the Historical Con-
sciousness and Commemorative Practices of Modern Vietnam” at Institute of Literature, Hanoi, on 
March 24, 2011, and discussed more detailed on that issue; see the talk’s outline:
 http://www.khoavanhoc.edu.vn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=885:ncs-
nguyn-quc-vinh-h-harvard&catid=43:thong-tin-khoa-hc&Itemid=102.
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It is worth noting that both the “new righteous forces” (Quang Trung and Liu Bei) 
took the title of pursuing social justice, punishing those who seized the power 
of Heaven’s son illegitimately. Liu Bei or Quang Trung do not take the throne 
directly from the old king; the throne comes to them after they find justice and 
protect the former Emperor. The Mandate is thus rightfully handed over to them. 
These characters often show their self-cultivation and their strict obedience to 
“Li”, while also demonstrating the virtue of a hero (yingxiong) and superior per-
son (junzi). Typical examples of these virtues include the scene when Liu Bei 
plans to throw his child, Liu Shan, away because Zhao Yun (a very loyal general 
under Liu) nearly died when trying to save him and the scene when Quang Trung 
leads his troops to hold a service for Heaven and Earth before going to the North. 
From all of this, we see that the film’s discourse is very sophisticated in explain-
ing why a new force could become the “righteous substitute” of an old dynasty 
(which was once “zhengming” in the past). The key point here is the issue of “na-
tional interests” and “the original class of the new hero”. The common scenario 
between the two films is as follows: to fight foreign invaders, a working-class 
hero must stand up to gather forces to fight enemies, protect the nation (when the 
old dynasty has weakened and cannot do this). After that, the new hero becomes 
the new king in a righteous manner. This scenario has a great similarity with re-
gard to the path of “overthrowing colonialism and feudalism, leading the people 
to regain the government” in the two communist states of Vietnam and China.
Below the Confucian Ethical Discourse: Utilitarianism, Paradoxes, 
and Ecological Injustice
Unfolding “the Virtue of Loving Life” of the Emperor and the Challenge 
of Environmental Justice
The films on the royal court that I am analysing in this paper seem to include a 
logical expression of the discourse on harmony between humans and nature from 
the perspective of East Asian cultural traditions. However, underneath that har-
mony and cosmic resonance, many contradictions and paradoxes also need to be 
explained. 
In the movies, Hero and Blood Letter, we need to return to the concept of a “son 
of Heaven” and also a great Emperor. In the feudal period, the king’s virtue is 
“loving life” (haosheng): “Whether it is a person, an animal, or a plant, just hav-
ing a life, all of them have the right to survive, so with those who have the ability 
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to give birth and nourish all things is called a person of virtue” (Trần 2013).15 
Therefore, the “Emperor used his power to extend the protection of sentient be-
ings in his dominion, which could be called a substitute for Heaven’s power. It 
also implies the equality between the virtue of emperor and the virtue of Heaven 
and Earth” (ibid., 32). In Hero, the journey of the king of Qin conquering the 
states displayed as a kind of divine mandate to bring unity, stability, and peace 
to all “under of Heaven” (tianxia). However, in the process of carrying out the 
mission of “protecting sentient beings”, Qin Wang killed countless lives, with 
their destruction necessary for the existence of the Han people and a supreme 
Emperor. In Blood Letter, the one who caused the terrible catastrophe to befall 
the Nguyen family is not punished at all, because Nguyên Vũ decides to give up 
his revenge to protect “all people from the bloody wars”. But the hidden part of 
the story is that no one can guarantee, under the power of the Empress, that there 
are no further tragedies, like those that happen to the Hoa Xuân family or Nguyễn 
family. Both films pursue the direction of reconciliation and neutrality, the end-
ing of individual oppositions, pushing the political focus to loyalty, and justifying 
the necessary existence of rulers who have a considerable responsibility and need 
to be kept from harm.
With The Red Cliff and Heroes of Tay Son Dynasty, we once again see two cate-
gories: righteousness and unrighteousness. People can only belong to one type or 
the other. Of course, if they are on the unrighteous side, their death is reasonable 
and undisputed. The contradiction here is when the “righteous leader” declares 
his virtue of “Loving Life” he is ready to kill his enemies. What I have called 
ecological/ biological injustice also arises from here. In Red Cliff, Zhou Yu and 
Zhuge Liang express their respect for living creature through a very romantic and 
emotional scene when they help a horse to give birth. But soon after this we see a 
series of opposing sequences when they burn thousands of Cao troops. They were 
extremely excited when they saved Zhou Yu’s pregnant wife, while around them 
there were countless corpses of young soldiers’ piled on the ground. Similarly, 
Heroes shows a close-up of a river full of dead bodies floating in the presence of 
the Emperor. The meeting points between the two films are that they both show 
epic scenes of battle in which thousands of people die because of two elements: 
water and fire (for instance, the fire burning on the river in Red Cliff, the fiery 
dragon in Fort Ngoc Hoi, and the bloody river in Heroes). These two factors are 
the result of the continuous transformation of Ch’i, but with the aim of killing 
15 “The Chinese word Haosheng, as quoted from the Yi Jing (I Ching), means ‘heaven has the vir-
tue of loving and promoting life.’ The Confucians added their own interpretation to this sacred 
concept, broadening it to encompass the human soul. They believed that the virtue of loving and 
promoting life is the ultimate desire in people’s hearts.” (Natural Medicine Clinic 2019)
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people, not leaders. Cosmology in these films, along with Confucian morality, is 
utilized and manipulated as a tool to restrain personal thoughts and the right to 
life of every living being. It also classifies people into righteous or unrighteous 
groups to justify the ruling discourse and the wars for power, which are the lead-
ing causes of the destruction of human and non-human creatures, as well as the 
natural environment.
In The Banquet and Tam Cam The Untold Story, the natural forces become a kind 
of symbolic tool to prove moral lessons and warn people, rather than to manifest 
the environmental issue itself. The ecological ambiguity is revealed in that even 
though these narratives seem to honour and praise natural beauty, the narrators 
and the characters almost forget the existence and fate of nature. Epistemological-
ly, people become the metaphysical vehicle carrying moral propositions. Onto-
logically, they turn into extraordinary creatures surpassing human influence with 
an infinite elasticity. In both aspects, nature is very distant from its ecological 
interrelations in the context of the medieval period from the perspective of mod-
ern people.
So, are there any joint and separate issues which challenge the manifestations of 
contemporary Chinese and Vietnamese films on royalty in close connection with 
Confucian cosmology?
Firstly, we can see the implications of the Confucian cosmology that is repro-
duced in these films. All the Emperors in the movies talk about Heaven’s mandate 
and cultivation as the only ways to connect with the universe. Natural elements 
are mystified and become an “omnipotent judge” that protects or punishes people 
based on whether or not they are cultivated according to pre-established moral 
principles. On the one hand, the filmmakers advocate respect for all living beings 
(including those in the lower classes or animals), but on the other hand, through 
the classification of ethics they also rationalize the process in which rulers could 
kill countless civilians and other living creatures. There are many extreme long 
shots of sky-high smoke, bodies on the ground, and broken plant life. 
Secondly, utilitarianism16 is combined with the principle of “Heaven’s mandate” 
and “rectification of names” to create a political discourse about the top leaders 
of countries and institutions. In the Chinese films (Hero, Red Cliff, The Ban-
quet), the institution or the representative is always identified with the “nation”, 
so obedience to the Emperor means faithfulness to the country. In contrast, in the 
Vietnamese movies (Heroes of the Tay Son Dynasty, Blood Letter, Tam Cam The 
16 According to the Cambridge Dictionary (2019), utilitarianism is “the system of thought that states 
that the best action or decision in a particular situation is the one that brings most advantages to the 
most people”.
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Untold Story), fidelity to the country will default to the voluntary duty of loyalty 
to the top leaders who represent the country. What these stories have in common 
is that they care about people from the perspective of maximizing the benefits that 
their actions can bring to the “community”. This logic also leads to another point: 
by keeping the current state and social order stable and not rebelling or opposing 
the superstructure, humans and other living things will not fall into chaos.
The third concern which is directly related to the two ideas presented above is that 
the personal identities and lives in these movies have been dissipated or blurred, 
giving way to the issues of territory and country. Constructing a world house un-
der the roof of Confucian ethics coloured by the mystically spiritual cosmology, 
the “great narratives” mentioned here are stories of and about the Emperor, not 
the story of the common folk, whose lives are not worth much. Regarding this, 
Tu Weiming affirmed, 
The strong belief in the inseparability of morality and politics and the 
correlation between the self-cultivation of the ruler and the governability 
of the people makes it difficult to conceive of politics as a mechanism of 
control independent of personal ethics. (Tu 1993, 6) 
I argue that this non-individual feature is a particular intersection between Con-
fucian moral discourse (here mainly Han Confucianism) and the philosophy of 
socialism, such as the ideas of “be loyal to the country, be filial to the people”, 
“collective spirit”, “one for everyone”, and so on. They are the necessary founda-
tions for the current socio-cultural management in both Vietnam and China (Min-
istry of Education of the People’s Republic of China 2006; Yu 2008; Vietnamese 
Ministry of Education and Training 2018).
Uncovering the Cinematic Framing of Landscape Beauty and the 
Commercializing Process of Natural Images
Utilizing and visualizing the so-called “tianren heyi” to produce propaganda to 
support the legitimacy of the current governments is also manifested in the aes-
thetic aspect of creating a series of picturesque frames. The beauty and tranquilli-
ty of natural landscapes signify the consonance between the “will of heaven” and 
“the rightful ruler”, even when this world had to experience many bloody battles. 
In other words, in the films discussed in this paper, the association of the author-
ities/rulers with beautiful nature clearly shows that Heaven’s will supports them. 
When an usurper takes over the throne, the universe is disturbed, and Heaven 
sends down angry messages through unprecedented natural disasters. When the 
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legitimate successor takes his position, the natural landscape returns to its origi-
nal state of complete beauty as if nothing had happened. This is the logic that is 
repeated stereotypically throughout all these movies. We realize the spectacular 
appearance of the lush bamboo forests in The Banquet, the glistening wharf and 
majestic mountains in Red Cliff, the pristine lake and dreamlike red leaves in 
Hero, the immense and splendid landscape in Blood Letter, the pure grassland 
and fields in Tam Cam, and the vast, stunning beach in Heroes. This mise-en-
scene uses drone cameras and extreme long shots to create flawless portraits of 
nature in the medieval era. It is a refined, vivid, and recoverable world, despite 
devastating wars.
We need to remember that all these movies belong to commercial cinema, and 
with that, the framing of image aesthetics of feudal royal family is the most vis-
ible expression of the so-called “cultural industry”, whose technologies were 
summed up in two terms by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno: “stand-
ardization” and “mass production” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2012, 47). Here, 
creating a picturesque landscape as a common denominator will help attract do-
mestic and foreign audiences to the exoticization of the natural and social scenes 
in East Asia. However, this exoticization, the featuring of feudal society, and the 
Confucian spirit are not synonymous with Western romanticism or the search for 
an uncontaminated and pastoral scenery without industrial machinery. In these 
films nature is only a platform for expressing moral discourses (and then political 
discourse) when adhering to spiritual cosmology as an appropriate way for the 
self-regulation of the people’s attitude towards the leaders. In addition to creating 
a refined green world utterly different to the state of severe environmental crisis 
seen in contemporary society, the directors also nationalized such scenes, consid-
ering the natural landscapes in the past as the unchangingly national identity in 
the present. In other words, they are “coding national identity” through famous 
and clichéd landscapes like “photography, postcards and posters”, thus repre-
senting images of the nation which are commercialized, mass-produced and sold 
everywhere for tourists (Thiesse and Norris 2003, 31). 
So here, what is contradictory when the filmmakers borrow Confucian moral-
ity to express a discourse of power following the socialist ideology, while the 
capitalist spirit is behind the production and promotion of these movies? In fact, 
due to the desire to increase soft power internationally, both China and Vietnam 
still maintain strict censorship of cultural products, whether domestic or imported 
(Yang 2016, 73).17 Not only that, but because commercial films occupy a signif-
17 See more in China Film Industry Promotion Law (中华人民共和国电影产业促进法) (2016) and 
The National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2010).
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icant market share in both countries, their impact on people is much faster and 
broader than that of independent art films. The cultural management agency of 
both countries has many policies on controlling and using commercial cinema 
as a sophisticated propaganda machine. This is the way that non-state studios 
can survive and remain profitable under the strict control of the socialist govern-
ments––by attracting an audience, “meeting the demands of the digital era” and 
satisfying the government’s requirements. In more concrete terms, 
non-state firms have been churning out works that have the kind of im-
pact the party craves. The goal of such businesses is to make money, not 
to create propaganda for its own sake. But to survive, they need to stay in 
the party’s good books. So they have found ways of producing pro-par-
ty entertainment that is popular. A common technique is appealing to 
youthful patriotism. (The Economist 2017) 
Another remarkable issue is that the independent art movies (IAM) of both coun-
tries do not focus on production centred on royal court life, as the commercial 
cinema does. Firstly, this may point to one direction for a new study on how 
the discourse of Confucian cosmology relates to mass audiences (which account 
for 90% of the film consumption market in both countries) and popular culture 
(which is not the target of the IAM), as part of a strategy to build soft power with 
regard to governing people. In a broader context, both Chinese and Vietnamese 
IAM have paid attention to Confucianism in contemporary spiritual life, but this 
“attention” is aimed to question, challenge, and reconstruct Confucianism, rather 
than mass-produce the same type of movies. For example, Jia Zhangke’s Still 
Life (2006) and Phan Dang Di’s Bi, Don’t Be Afraid! (2010), which are two typ-
ical films of two prominent directors of IAM in both countries, showed critical 
aspects of Confucian ethics in contemporary society, especially the breakdown 
of ceremonial practices and spiritual weakness with regard to social beliefs in the 
attachment between humanity and natural forces. Instead of seeing homogeneous 
and flawless “utopias”, we only see the heterogeneous and imperfect “dystopias”, 
a broken world, degraded environment and exhausted cities like Hanoi in Bi, 
Don’t Be Afraid! or Chongqing in Still Life. 
It can be seen that the making of picturesque aesthetics in these commercial 
movies, the invention of a “safe”, “pure”, “permanent”, and “inviolable” reali-
ty co-ordinating with the discourses on “tianren heyi”, cosmic balance, and so-
cial order, play an important part in reproducing “the dominant corporate and 
commercial culture, excluding discourses and images that contest the established 
social system” (Durham and Kellner 2012, xii). Thus, there is no contradiction 
in the way the cultural industry in these two socialist countries manipulates the 
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masses through an implicit political discourse, which is based on Hollywood cap-
italism and a socialist orientation at the same time. This particular policy shows 
its effectiveness within the current popular culture of China and Vietnam, in par-
ticular through the commercial success of most such films as well as the positive 
responses of the governments to them.18 
Does this specific form of co-production exist in Korea and Japan, which are 
two capitalist countries that have the same Confucian foundations as China and 
Vietnam? In Korea, all recent movies on the royal court have chosen the Joseon 
dynasty (1392–1910) as a shared historical memory between South and North 
Korea. They have not romanticized or deified the king-servant relationship, and 
most of them follow a modernist style in exploring the limits and contradictions 
in the personal inner lives of the characters, as seen in Masquerade (Choo 2012), 
The Fatal Encounter (Lee 2014), The King and the Clown (Lee 2015), Rampant 
(Kim 2018), etc. Meanwhile, Japan is a very specific East Asian case, since from 
the beginning of the twenty-first century up to now there has not been a film that 
directly mentions the “Emperor of Japan” (Tennō), or the issues of a power strug-
gle in Tennō’s reign. Genji Monogatari: Sennen no Nazo (Yasuo 2011, adapted 
from Murasaki Shikibu’s classic literary work) is considered to be the only film 
set in “the Tennō’s reign”, but mainly focuses on the personal and emotional 
life of Prince Genji and not the political side of things. Other historical period 
films (Jidaigeki) often emphasize the figures of Japanese samurai and nobles as 
the central characters, especially in Akira Kurosawa’s most well-known movies. 
Both Korean and Japanese films often seek to express the indeterminacy and 
difficulty of court life through the look of realism, not through perfect, beautiful, 
and romantic frames which are the basis for Vietnamese and Chinese cinema on 
royalty.
Top-down Direction and Bottom-up Direction: Two Ways of Discourse on 
Power in Chinese and Vietnamese Films
Despite sharing the ideas of utilitarianism, paradoxes, and ecological injustice 
hidden below Confucian moral discourse in both content and cinematic language, 
18 Almost all of the above films have high box office returns compared to the regional (Chinese ones) 
and with domestic movies (Vietnamese ones), winning some state and international awards, such 
as Hero (177,394,432 USD; Best Cinematography, Best Art Direction in Hong Kong Film Awards 
2002); Red Cliff 1,2 (250,100,000 USD; Best Visual Effects in 3rd Asian Film Awards, Best Art Di-
rection in 28th Hong Kong Film Awards); Blood Letter (740,000 USD; Jury Prize for Feature-length 
film in Hanoi International Film Festival 2012, Vietnam Film Festival Award for Best Feature Film 
2013); Tam Cam (3,000,000 USD; 2017 Silver Kite Award for Feature Film), and so on.
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the approaches of the Vietnamese and Chinese directors still have distinct 
differences.
In the Chinese films, the concept of “Heaven’s will” is often downward. The dis-
course direction of power comes from top to bottom, from higher to lower levels 
on the social ladder, and often from the view and the value of the Emperors (like 
Qin Wang in Hero or Han Wang and Liu Bei in Red Cliff). Chinese directors are 
interested in the expression of the Emperor’s virtue and legitimacy, which let “the 
bottom people” be totally persuaded by their power and legitimacy. For example, 
Qin Shihuang receives sympathy from the assassins in Hero; Liu Bei is initially 
misunderstood by his followers, but finally, his wisdom is confirmed in Red Cliff; 
Prince Wu in The Banquet even has to make a sacrifice for “big karma”, but also 
shows his integrity when he gets revenge for his father’s death. The good quali-
ties of “subordinates” through the eyes and expectations of their “superiors” are 
faithfulness, respect for “Heaven’s mandate”, obedience to cosmological law, and 
a willingness to sacrifice one’s life for those moral beliefs. Also, in Chinese films 
the concept of “under Heaven” is respected and emphasized in imperial charac-
ters in order to justify their actions. 
In general, the Chinese films closely follow the dominant conception of Han Con-
fucianism (especially of Dong Zhongshu), which is the “doctrine to the need for 
the Empire” (Yao and Yao 2000, 8). Through the main ideas of the “theological 
and metaphysical doctrine of interaction between Heaven and humans”, these 
movies tend to promote the ruling class and the idea that the Emperor is a superior 
being who carries the sacred mission of unifying the world and ruling the people 
(ibid.). Those films also focus on the Mandate of Heaven, duties of subordinates, 
stories of fidelity and infidelity, and the inviolably hierarchical order of society, 
as well as of the universe. The direction of building Confucian spirit in cinema 
as well as in other cultural industries in the new Chinese era is becoming one of 
the essential spearheads of political discourse, a way to expand international in-
fluence and strengthen the stability of the regime domestically (Tu 2000; Li and 
Witteborn 2012). 
In contrast, the direction of the power discourse in the Vietnamese films on royal-
ty is mostly upwards in terms of how the lower people express their observations 
and expectations to the Emperors. Most of the main characters in the narratives 
are “subordinates” under the dynasties: Nguyên Vũ in Blood Letter, Tấm in Tam 
Cam the Untold Story, General Nguyễn Huệ in Heroes of the Tay Son Dynasty, 
and so on. These characters all bear unhappiness, pain, or other challenges that 
are sent by destiny. Thanks to their self-cultivation and education, they are able 
to surpass their suffering and receive signs from Heaven to liberate their lives: 
155Asian Studies VIII (XXIV), 2 (2020), pp. 135–162
“Heaven already has let you know, you have to find justice for your family”, “if 
the blood letter is true, it is Heaven’s ideal” (Blood Letter); “following Heaven’s 
will and the people’s aspiration”, “standing in front of Heaven and Earth” (He-
roes); “obey Heaven’s order” (Tam Cam), etc. The majority of stories are directed 
to the process of self-cultivation to become a superior person (junzi) and a loyal 
servant. From the upward point of view, an ideal leader is one who combines 
good governance (dezhi) with the law (fazhi) to establish cosmological order. Of 
course, he or she must receive the mandate of Heaven (like the Empress Dowager 
in Blood Letter, King Le Hien Tong in Heroes, King and Crown Prince in Tam 
Cam). The common people seem ready to help and support the monarchs uncon-
ditionally, based on their mystical and boundless power of the universe. 
The Vietnamese films primarily carry the original Vietnamized Confucian ele-
ments that combine indigenous beliefs, Taoism, and Buddhism. In explaining the 
uniqueness of Confucianism in today’s Vietnam, Nguyen Kim Son argues that 
the revival of Confucianism in the 21st century is not the rebirth of the 
general Confucianism, but the rebirth of a Confucian division which is 
profoundly Vietnamized, the rebirth of Vietnamese Confucianism with 
all the advantages and drawbacks that it has ever shown. (Nguyễn 2003, 
56) 
Based on this, Nguyễn Kim Son makes an important observation: “The position 
of Confucianism and Confucius is also improving, but for the Vietnamese it is 
still a process to honour Vietnamese tradition, but not to honour Confucianism 
and Confucius, although those two are closely related”. (ibid.) The ultimate goal 
is to praise the “plentiful cultural tradition” and nationalism in which the Viet-
namese nation always presents itself as a righteous subject, protecting itself from 
the invasion of foreign powers.
Conclusion
In East Asian Confucian countries, the royal and imperial court is part of the 
regional co-cultural memory. As I pointed out above, in the first two decades of 
the twenty-first century the breakthrough blockbuster movie Hero, as well as the 
globalization of the entertainment and film industries, have helped historical peri-
od movies about royal court life to become very popular in East Asia and beyond.
In a series of films about royalty released from 2002 to the present, both Chinese 
and Vietnamese movies have many similarities in how they feature Confucian 
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ethics and cosmology in contemporary society, in contrast to Japan and South 
Korea, the two other East Asian countries that share these traditions. Moreover, al-
though these Chinese and Vietnamese movies are focused on depicting the beauty 
and power of natural forces, and the metaphysical phenomena of the universe be-
yond humanity, the central discourse platform is not directed towards an ecologi-
cal/environmental message. It is instead done through seemingly non-modern and 
eye-catching frames, which are, in fact, expressing a strict and fierce socio-politi-
cal philosophy. Through the return to Confucian tradition which is deeply rooted 
in the consciousness of East Asians, and through one of the most beloved prod-
ucts of the cultural industries––cinema––the authorities in China and Vietnam 
have found a suitable way to approach and influence the mass audience, directing 
them to appropriate thoughts and actions to benefit the current institutions. Here, 
the boundaries between Confucian ethics (in constructing the model of an ideal 
governor as a representative for the collective, community and whole nation), 
socialist ideology (in putting the rights and powers of “collectives” and the “com-
munity” above those of individuals), and the capitalist spirit (in focusing on mass 
production to meet demands of popular culture and get the most profit) have be-
come subtly and skilfully harmonized in the form of a commercial entertainment 
product. These three aspects seem to be far away from each other, but are more 
connected than ever with state management and orthodox thought, especially in 
today’s China and Vietnam, where the leaders are interested in the use of soft 
power in guiding the people to follow their socialist-oriented market economies.
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Nguyễn Huệ: Những di sản và bài học (Quang Trung Nguyễn Huệ: Legacies 
and Lessons). Ho Chi Minh City: Saigon Culture publisher.
Phan, Văn Các. 1994. “Nghiên cứu Nho giáo Việt Nam trong bối cảnh khu vực 
và thời đại (Vietnamese Confucian Studies in Regional and Era Contexts).” 
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